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[S. F. No. 18792.

In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1953.]

THE .AETNA CASUALTY .AND SURETY COMP.ANY (a
Corporation), .Appellant, v. P .ACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMP .ANY (a Corporation) et al., Defendants;
BECHTEL CORPORATION (a Corporation), Respondent.
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Persons- Limitation of Actions.-Employee's general damage
claim, whether prosecuted by employee personally or by his
employer or its insurance carrier on his behalf, is solely one
in tort for personal injuries arising out of negligence of third
party tort feasor; hence cause of action accrues at time of
negligent act and, regardless of who may be party plaintiff, is
governed by one-year statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. 3) rather
than by three-year statute applicable to liabilities created by
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, sub d. 1), there being nothing
in Lab. Code, §§ 3850-3863, relating to subrogation of employer to employee's rights of recovery against tort feasor,
which would indicate intention to impose greater burden on
tort feasor insofar as time limit of suit is concerned.
[2] Limitation of Actions-Period of Limitations-Torts.-Code
Civ. Proc., § 340, suhd. 3, is a special statute controlling time
within which an action for personal injuries may be commenced, and it prevails over general statute applicable to
actions based on a "liability created by statute." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 338, subd. 1.)
[3] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Finality as to Parties.-Nonappearance of one defendant in an action does not preclude
judgment, with respect to other defendant which appeared,
from being a final appealable judgment.
[1] Statute of Limitations applicable to action by employer or
insurance carrier subrogated to workmen's compensation claimant's
rights as against tort feasor, note, 95 A.L.R. 1431. See, also,
Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 10 et seq.; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 367.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Limitation of Actions, § 102 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 40; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 22.
McK. Dig. Refere:qces: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 29; [2]
Limitation of Actions, § 42; [3] Appeal and Error, § 30; [4]
Workmen's Compensation, §§ 33, 38.
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[4] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third PersonsJudgment and AppeaL-In action by employer's insurance
carrier against a third party tort feasor for injuries s11stained
by employee, cause of action to recover on plaintiff's own
behalf alleged amount of compensation benefits paid by defendant to injured employee and cause of action to recover as
statutory trustee for such employee the alleged general damages suffered by him may be treated as separate matters for
litigation in discretion of court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 579),
and judgment of dismissal on cause of action last mentioned
is a final determination of rights of plaintiff as statutory
trustee; such judgment should be regarded as having same
measure of finality as would a similar judgment in action in
which there were two plaintiffs seeking their respective damages from same defendant on two severable causes of action,
and hence is appealable under Code Civ. Proc., § 963.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Theresa Meikle, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action by compensation insurance carrier for damages suffered by employee of insured. Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Van H. Pinney for Appellant.
Partridge, O'Connell & Whitney and Wallace O'Connell
for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff is the compensation insurance
carrier for an employer whose employee sustained an industrial injury allegedly caused by the negligence of third
party defendants. In its fourth cause of action plaintiff
sought to recover the employee's general tort damages. The
action was brought more than one year but less than three
years after occurrence of the accident which caused the injury.
A demurrer to this fourth cause of action was sustained without leave to amend, and from the judgment of dismissal accordingly entered, plaintiff appeals.
The determinative question is whether the fourth cause of
action is governed by the one-year statute of limitations
applicable to an action for damages ''for the injury to . . .
one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" (Code
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. 3) or the three-year statute applicable
to an action "upon a liability created by statute" (Code Civ.
Proc., § 338, subd. 1). The Labor Code authorizes the em-
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ployer or its insurance carrier to bring an action against
the third party tort feasor ( §§ 3850, 3852) and to include
therein the general damages to the employee as well as the
special damages to the employer for compensation and medical
benefits ( § 3854). .Assuming, without deciding, that this liability of the tort feasor to the employer or its insurance carrier for the employee's general damages is one created by
statute (cf. Limited Mutual Comp. Ins. Co. v. Billings, 74
Cal..App.2d 881, 884-885 [169 P.2d 673], nevertheless under
settled legal principles the trial COlJ.rt correctly concluded that
the one-year statute applied.
[la] The employee's general damage claim, whether prosecuted by the employee personally or by his employer or its
insurance carrier on his behalf, is solely one in tort for
personal injuries arising out of the negligence of the third
party tort feasor; hence the cause of action accrues at the
time of the negligent act. No matter who may be the party
plaintiff, the cause of action is one within the express terms
of subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[2] That section is a special statute controlling the time
within which any action covering such injury may be commenced, and it prevails over the general statute applicable
to actions based upon a ''liability created by statute.'' (Code
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 1.) In line with this principle, the
one-year statute has been held applicable to an action for
personal injuries based upon the liability of the owner of ah
automobile for imputed negligence of the driver thereof under
section 402 of the Vehicle Code (Franceschi v. Scott, 7 Cal.
.App.2d 494, 495-496 [46 P.2d 764]) and to an action for
personal injuries based upon the liability of the driver's
parents who had signed and verified the driver's application
for an operator's license as required by section 352 of the
Vehicle Code (McFarland v. Cordiero, 99 Cal.App. 352,
354-355 [278 P. 889]). Certainly if such principle applies in
cases where a new person, by virtue of statutory authority,
may be sued on a personal injury claim (see Ridley v. Young,
64 Cal.App.2d 503, 509 [149 P.2d 76] ), it should apply here
where a new person, under statutory authority, may sue on a
personal injury claim. [lb] There is nothing in the Labor
Code ( §§ 3850-3863) which would indicate an intention to
impose a greater burden on the tort feasor if recovery on the
employee's damage claim is sought by the employer or its
insurance carrier rather than the injured employee insofar as
the time of suit is concerned. The tort liability to respond in
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general damages of the personal injury claim remains the
same. To hold otherwise would produce the anomalous result
whereby the employee's tort action would be barred if he undertook to prosecute it and yet the employer or its insurance
carrier could recover damages at a later date for the employee
on that same cause of action. .Accordingly, plaintiff unavailingly argues that its ''fourth cause of action'' is governed by
the general three-year statute of limitations applicable to a
"liability created by statute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 338,
subd. 1.)
During the pendency of the appeal it was suggested that
the judgment of dismissal of the fourth cause of action was
not a final judgment, and was therefore not appealable.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) Counsel were then asked to stipulate regarding the status of the record. .According to their
stipulation, the complaint was filed with one plaintiff and two
defendants and embodied four causes of action: the first is
against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to recover on
plaintiff's own behalf the sum of $1,684.12, being the alleged
amount of compensation benefits paid by it to the injured employee; the second is against the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company to recover as statutory trustee for the injured employee (Lab. Code, § 3854) the sum of $50,000 being the
alleged general damages suffered by the injured employee ;
the third is similar to the first but against Bechtel Corporation to recover on plaintiff's own behalf the same alleged
amount of compensation benefits paid by it to the injured
employee; and the fourth is similar to the second but against
Bechtel Corporation to recover as statutory trustee for the
injured employee the same alleged general damages suffered
by him. Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company has
never appeared in the action.
[3] The nonappearance of defendant Pacific Gas and
Electric Company in this action does not preclude the judgment with respect to the other appearing defendant from
being a final appealable judgment. (Rocca v. Steinmetz,
189 Cal. 426, 428 [208 P. 964]; Howe v. Key System Transit
Co., 198 Cal. 525, 529 [246 P. 39]; Young v. Superior Court,
16 Cal.2d 211, 215 [105 P.2d 363]; Weisz v. McKee, 31 Cal.
A.pp.2d 144, 147 [87 P.2d 379].) [4] While there appears
to be no authority on the effect of the admitted nonadjudication of the third cause of action in relation to the fina:lity of
the judgment entered on the fourth cause of action in favor of
the same defendant, Bechtel Corporation, practical considera-
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tions and legal principles sustain the propriety of treating
these two causes of action as separate matters for litigation
in the discretion of the court. (See Code Civ. Pro c., § 579.)
The judgment on the fourth cause of action was a final
determination of the rights of plaintiff as statutory trustee
seeking to recover general damages for the benefit of the
injured employee. As a final determination of the rights of
plaintiff in that capacity, such judgment should be regarded
as having the same measure of finality as would a similar
judgment in an action in which there were two plaintiffs
seeking their respective damages from the same defendant on
two severable causes of action: (1) the insurance carrier
for recovery of its own compensation expenditures; and (2)
the injured employee for recovery of his own general damages.
Such cases as Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174],
and Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100], involve an entirely different situation in that there each of the
successive judgments left undetermined between the same
parties in their same individual capacities another alleged
cause or causes of action for the same identical relief. Under
the circumstances here, we conclude that the judgment of
dismissal of the fourth cause of action is a final judgment
within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is therefore appealable.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The appeal in this case should be dismissed as there is no
final judgment, but if the case is to be decided on its merits,
the three-year statute of limitation for a liability created by
statute is applicable, and the judgment should be reversed.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 338(1).)
On the question of appeal, it appears that there is yet no
final judgment in the action from which an appeal may be
taken. The record shows that the complaint on file purported
to state four causes of action. The first asserts negligence
on the part of one defendant, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, resulting in injury to Cabella, an employee of plaintiff's insured, in the course of his employment and the payment of workmen's compensation to him. The second realleges the allegations of the first and claims Cabella was
damaged by the injury in the sum of $50,000. In the third,
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the allegations of the first are again adopted and it alleges
another defendant, Bechtel, was also negligent, and claim is
made for payments made for workmen's compensation. The
fourth realleges the third and claims damages to Cabella of
$50,000.
Apparently defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company
did not demur. At any rate, that is not here important.
The third and fourth causes of action were for defendant
Bechtel's negligence in injuring Cab ella, the employee, the
third asking as damages only the amount paid by plaintiff
to Cabella for workmen's compensation and the fourth for
additional damages suffered by Cabella. The demurrer was
sustained as to the fourth cause only and the judgment entered
dismissed that cause of action only. The appeal was taken
from that judgment. That judgment is not appealable for
there can be but one judgment in an action. After trial on the
third cause of action is had, another judgment would be
entered. That is to say, there cannot be separate judgments
on different causes of action where the same parties are involved. The judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action
is interlocutory and hence not appealable. (Mather v. Mather,
5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174] ; Bank of America v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal.2d 697 [128 P.2d 357] ; Greenfield v. Mather,
14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100] ; Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d
116 [199 P.2d 668] .) The rule is stated in Bank of America
v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701: "They assume
that there can be a piecemeal disposition of the several counts
of a complaint. They assume, when there is more than one
count in a complaint, and a demurrer is interposed and sustained, and a judgment of dismissal entered, that there are as
many separate judgments as there are counts in the complaint.
That is not the law. There cannot be a separate judgment as
to one count in a complaint containing several counts. On
the contrary, there can be but one judgment in an action no
matter how many counts the complaint contains. (De Vally
v. Kendall De Vally 0. Co., Ltd., 220 Cal. 742 [32 P. (2d)
638]; Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. (2d) 617 [55 P. (2d) 1174];
Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 130 Cal.App. 510
[20 P. (2d) 129] .) In the De Vally case, supra, a demurrer
was sustained and a judgment entered dismissing two counts
of a four-count complaint. The court held that the judgment
was premature, and dismissed the appeal from it, and stated
( p. 745) : 'Although the matter is not mentioned by counsel
for either side, it appears that the court should not have
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given a judgment herein until the final disposition of the
entire cause. The law contemplates but one :final judgment
in a cause. .As stated in the case of N o~an v. Smith, 137 Cal.
360, 361 [ 70 Pac. 166], quoting from Stockton etc. W arks v.
Glen Fa.lls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. (557) 577 [33 Pac. 633]: "There
can be but one :final judgment in an action, and that is one
which in effect ends the suit in the court in which it was
entered, and :finally determines the rights of the parties in
relation to the matter in controversy." ' This language was
approved in the Potvin case, supra, where the court said
(p. 512): 'Since a :final judgment in an action contemplates a
complete adjudication of the rights of the parties and a :final
determination of the matter in controversy, it is apparent
that the so-called judgment rendered upon the sustaining
of a demurrer to one cause of action of a complaint without
leave to amend, leaving :five other causes of action unimpaired
presenting matters to be litigated during a trial of the issues
of fact, cannot be regarded as a :final determination and disposal of the cause.' "
The majority seeks to escape this rule by stating that because plaintiff was suing in one capacity in the third count
of the complaint, that is, in his own right, and in the fourth
count, as trustee for his injured employee, the judgment
entered on the fourth count is a final judgment. That is to
say, there could be two :final judgments in the case, one on
the third count and the other on the fourth count. The reason
given is that it would be like a case where two plaintiffs, each
seeking damages from the same defendant on ''severable''
causes of action, one being by the insurance carrier for its
compensation expenditures and the other by the employee for
his personal injuries.
The reasoning is faulty. The basic notion of one single
judgment as stated in all the cases hereinabove cited is that
all the factual issues should be settled in one judgment, unless
on a collateral matter one of several parties presents issues
which are finally adjudicated as to him. In the instant case
there are not two parties plaintiff in any true sense because
the recovery by plaintiff on either cause of action rests upon
identical issues: Was the defendant negligent? Was plaintiff's injured employee contributively negligent? If defendant
was negligent and plaintiff's employee not, how much damages
has the latter suffered? Plaintiff as employer is not entitled
to recover any amount on his own behalf unless he is entitled
to recover on behalf of his employee, and if he is entitled
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to recover on behalf of the latter, the right of the employer
to recover what he has paid in compensation and medical
expenses follows as a matter of course; there is really no
issue on the right to recover those two items of damage. Hence
there cannot be any finality to a judgment as to the employer
and not as to the employee or vice versa, whether either or
both or one or the other is suing. Thus, this is not in fact a
severable action to the extent at least that two judgments are
required or proper.
The law authorizes these causes of action to be joined, and
it is at least doubtful that they could be brought separately.
Certainly, if they were brought separately, a judgment on one
as to liability would be res judicata as to the other. Suppose
the statute of limitation had not run, could plaintiff now
bring another action on behalf of the employee 1 It seems
obvious to me that it could not. Then how can separate judgments be rendered in this action if only one action could be
brought?
With reference to the statute of limitation, the majority
holds that inasmuch as a personal injury is involved the oneyear statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340(3)) applies rather than
the three-year period for a statutory liability. That conclusion
is reached by construing the provision relating to an injury
to a person as being special or particular whereas the one dealing with statutory liability is general and the particular controls over the general. The effect of this holding is that every
action or proceeding mentioned in the limitation statutes prevails over the statutory liability provision regardless of
whether the liability is or is not created by statute. This is
true because all of them would be particular, like an injury to
a person, and thus controlling over the statutory liability section. The result is to give to the statutory liability section
no more effect than if it were an omnibus or catch-all proVISion. That it was not intended as such is plain. The
Legislature has expressly enacted such a statute. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 343.) The statutory liability section is read out of
the books as the test is no longer whether or not the liability
is created by statute, as all the previous authorities supposed,
it is whether there is some other provision fitting the case.
There is no basis for the assumption that the personal
injury section is particular and the statutory liability general. On the contrary, there are undoubtedly more of the
former than of the latter.
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The cases demonstrate that the test of whether a liability
js created by statute and thus controlled by the limitation
statute, is whether, except for the statute there would not be
liability; the test is not that stated by the majoriy. In
Barber v. Mulford, 117 Cal. 356 [49 P. 206], it was held
that a mandamus proceeding to compel the payment of a claim
against a county based on contract was a statutory liability
because it was the county's duty by statute to pay it. Recovery of commissions by the district attorney on moneys collected by him from the county is governed by the three-year
statute, not the two-year period for liabilities not founded on
a written instrument. (Ht~gby v. Calaveras County, 18 Cal.
176.) An action on the official bond of an officer is controlled by the three-year statutory liability provision although
the bond is a contract. (County of Sonoma v. Hall, 132 Cal.
589 [62 P. 257, 312, 65 P. 12, 459]; Norton v. Title Guaranty
&; Surety Co., 176 Cal. 212 [168 P. 16] ; Hellwig v. Title etc.
Co., 39 Cal.App. 422 [179 P. 222].)
Here it is clear that in the absence of statute the employer
would have no cause of action for injuries suffered by his employee, hence, the liability, if any, is created by statute, and
the three-year statute of limitation applies.
Shenk, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
I agree with Mr. Justice Carter that the appeal should be
dismissed for the reasons set forth in his opinion.

